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FIFTH AMENDMENT-IMPEACHMENT
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975)
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975)
In two recent cases the Supreme Court considered
whether evidence which is inadmissible as proof of
guilt may be used by the prosecution on cross-examination to impeach the credibility of a defendant who
testifies in his own behalf. The first case, Oregon v.
Hass,I raised the issue of admitting for purposes of
impeachment illegally obtained statements made by
an accused during police interrogation. The accused
was properly informed of his rights as required by
Miranda v. Arizona,' and he then attempted to
exercise them by asking to contact his lawyer. The
Court held that his subsequent statements were
properly admitted at trial for the limited purpose of
impeaching his credibility. Relying on Harrisv. New
York, 3 and rejecting the argument that the police
would be encouraged to press their investigation
before the accused had benefit of counsel, the Court
in Hass reduced the effectiveness of the safeguards
against self-incrimination provided by Miranda.'
In the second case, United States v. Hale,' the
Court confronted the issue of whether an accused's
silence in the face of police questioning can be used to
impeach his exculpatory testimony at trial. It found
that the accused's failure to respond to questioning
could be understood in several ways, and did not
necessarily imply that his later explanations were
false. Therefore, comment on the defendant's pre'420 U.S. 714 (1975).
2384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that four
warnings be given to a suspect before questioning begins:
his right to remain silent; the fact that what he says can be
used in court against him; his right to counsel; and his right
to free counsel if indigent. Id. at 479. Statements made by
the defendant when he has not been fully informed of his
rights are not admissible as evidence against him.
3401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris the accused was not
informed of his right to consult an attorney. The Court
permitted the prosecution to use his statements in crossexamination, drawing a distinction between evidence used
for the prosecution's case in chief and statements used to
impeach the credibility of the defendant who testifies at
trial. Id. at 225-26. For a discussion of Harris see Note,
Fifth Amendment-Impeachment, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
473 (1971).
'Miranda states that if an individual asks to consult an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is
present. 384 U.S. at 474.
5422 U.S. 171 (1975).

trial silence was highly -prejudicial and should have
been excluded. The Court rested its opinion on
evidentiary grounds, declining to reach the question
of constitutional privilege.
These two cases, treating the issue of whether a
defendant's reactions to police interrogation may be
used to impeach him, consider the value of the
evidence as proof of inconsistency, rather than the
extent to which a defendant's constitutional rights
may be infringed. In Hass, the value of prior
inconsistent statements is assumed, and the Court
deals only with the problem of admitting illegal
evidence; in Hale, the Court holds that silence has
very little value for proving inconsistency. Neither
case devotes much attention to the issue of selfincrimination. The Court in Hass has continued to
limit Miranda, and in Hale it has looked to a
pre-Miranda decision as the controlling authority.
IMPEACHMENT

BY

PRIOR

INCONSISTENT

STATEMENTS

The defendant in Oregon v. Hass was arrested,
informed of his rights, and questioned about the theft
of a bicycle from a residential garage. He replied that
two bicycles had been stolen and he did not know
which one the officer was talking about. He had
returned one, and the other was where he had left it.
In the patrol car, Hass said that he was in a lot of
trouble and would like to telephone a lawyer. The
officer told him he could do so when they got back.
Then Hass responded to further questions, pointing
out the spot where one bicycle was hidden, and
indicating the two houses from which the bicycles
had been taken.
The trial court ruled that statements made by
Hass after he said he wanted to see a lawyer were not
admissible in evidence. Hass then testified that he
had been riding with two friends, that he did not
know the bicycles were going to be stolen, but that he
had helped to conceal one of them. He also denied
knowing which houses had been burglarized. The
police officer testified in rebuttal that Hass had made
statements about the location of the houses and had
pointed them out. The jury was instructed that these
statements could not be considered as proof of guilt,
19
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but only as bearing on the defendant's credibility as a
witness. Hass was convicted of burglary.
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed 6 because
the trial court allowed information obtained by police
in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony. It noted that Harris v. New
York' held such evidence to be admissible for
impeachment purposes, but considered itself bound
by Oregon precedent.' The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed.' It reasoned that Harris was not
controlling because that was a case where the
defendant had given information to the police before
he had been told of his right to consult an attorney. "o
In the present case, however, proper warnings had
been given, and the accused had chosen to exercise
his rights. If the State were permitted to use his
subsequent statements for impeachment, the police
would have an incentive for pressing the investigation before the accused could be given legal advice. ' 1
The United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon. It held
that statements made by Hass in police custody after
he had been told of his rights and had asked to
telephone a lawyer, but before he had been given the
opportunity to do so, -were iadmissible at trial for
impeachment purposes. The Court reviewed the case
because "it bore upon the reach of our decision in
Harris v. New York." 2
In that case, the defendant Harris was convicted of
selling narcotics to an undercover agent. At trial he
testified that he had sold the agent two envelopes of
baking powder in a scheme to defraud the purchaser.
The prosecution then questioned him about incriminating admissions he had made during police
interrogation, before he had been informed of his
right to consult an attorney. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider these statements only as
reflecting on the defendant's credibility. The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's credibility
was appropriately impeached by the use of his earlier
conflicting statements. While Miranda barred such
evidence from being used to establish the prosecu613 Ore. App. 368, 510 P.2d 852 (1973).
7401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'The Oregon case, decided before Harris, was State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387
U.S. 943 (1967).
'267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973).
"By the same reasoning, the court found it unnecessary
to consider whether to overrule State v. Brewton, 247 Ore.
241, 422 P.2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967),
where information secured in violation of the rules set forth
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) was not
permitted to be used for impeachment purposes.
1267 Ore. at 493, 517 P.2d at 673.
'2420 U.S. at 718.
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tion's case, it did not follow that the evidence was
inadmissible for all purposes. '3
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in
Hass,14 applied the principles of Harris, and stated
that impeaching material can provide "valuable
aid" to the jury in assessing the defendant's credibility. The majority felt that the value of this process
should not be sacrificed because of some "speculative
possibility" that police misconduct would be encouraged by permitting the prosecution to make use
of such evidence to impeach a defendant's testimony.
If it is assumed that deterrence of police misconduct
is necessary, said Justice Blackmun, there is sufficient deterrence when illegally obtained evidence
is made inadmissible for the case in chief. If in a

particular case an officer's conduct becomes abusive,
"that case... may be taken care of when it arises
measured by the traditional standards for evaluating
voluntariness and trustworthiness."" But to ex-

clude impeaching statements altogether would be to
give the defendant a license for perjury. 16
The effect of inadmissibility in the Harris case and in
this case is the same: inadmissibility would pervert the
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the
embarrassment of impeachment evidence from the
defendant's own mouth."
3
" The Court in Harris said that Miranda comments
barring use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose
were not necessary to the holding of that case. 401 U.S. at
224.
4
" Justice Blackmun was joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Stewart, White, Powell and Rehnquist. Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote dissenting opinions.
Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration of the
case.
Is420 U.S. at 723. The Harris requirement that the
trustworthiness of the evidence satisfy "legal standards"
was apparently met in this case, as in Hams, by the fact
that the defendant's statements to the police had not been
coerced. Miranda stated a broader view of coercion:
[Alny statement taken after the person invokes his
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
384 U.S. at 474. Harrisabandoned the assumption that a
statement cannot be truly voluntary unless a suspect is fully
aware of his rights and makes a knowing and intelligent
waiver. See Note, Harrisv. New York: The Retreat from
Miranda, 32 LA. L. REv. 650 (1972).
6
" The assumption here is that statements made to the
police will all be true. As a matter of fact, in the Harriscase
the District Attorney acknowledged that the account defendant gave police was false. See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
L.J. 1198, 1222 & n.96 (1971). Petitioner's lawyer
pointed out that an inexperienced person, without benefit
of counsel, may be afraid to tell the police what happened
and may make up a false exculpatory statement. Id.
11420 U.S. at 723.

19751
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The Court dismissed the deterrence argument who requests an attorney, "since the attorney will
made by the Supreme Court of Oregon for distin- advise the accused to remain silent."' 2 He was
guishing Harris. The state court said that police unwilling to join in what he regarded as a "fundawere generally unwilling to risk losing directly mental erosion" of fifth and sixth amendment rights.
admissible evidence by failing to give warnings, and
Justice Marshall's separate dissenting opinion,
that therefore the Harris decision perhaps did not joined by Justice Brennan, discussed the question of
encourage police violations. But the police would, it jurisdiction. He felt that the Court should not have
felt, have an incentive for pressing the investigation, exercised jurisdiction in this case, since there was a
in violation of Miranda, after the suspect asked for a possibility that the state court judgment had been
lawyer. The chance of obtaining statements with based on independent state grounds. 22
which to discredit the defendant at trial was signifiWhere we have been unable to say with certainty
cantly more than the police were likely to have after
that
thejudgment rested solely on federal law grounds,
the suspect was advised by counsel. 'Justice Blackwe have refused to rule on the federal issue in the case;
mun described this as a "speculative possibility,"
the proper course is then either to dismiss the writ as
apparently implying that the deterrence argument
to the
improvidently granted or to remand the case
23
has been exaggerated. In addition, he could find no
state court to clarify the basis of its decision.
significant difference between an inadvertent failure
to adhere to Miranda rules and a deliberate disre- Justice Marshall also felt that it was sound policy to
gard for full compliance. In both instances the permit the state court to decide whether its police
penalty was the same, that is, loss of directly would be subject to stricter rules than were required
admissible evidence, and thus the deterrent effect was as a federal constitutional minimum. The decision of
the Oregon court purported to deter police misconpresumably equal and adequate.
duct by completely excluding illegally obtained stateOne might concede that when proper Miranda
ments. This was, he felt, an independent conclusion
warnings have been given, and the officer then continin an area appropriate for state determination. Jusues his interrogation after the suspect asks for an
tice Marshall added that even if the decision had
attorney, the officer may be said to have little to lose
been based solely on federal law, the case should be
and perhaps something to gain by way of possibly
remanded; the state still had the option of consideruncovering impeachment material. This speculative
ing the defendant's state law claims, or of ruling the
possibility, however, is even greater where the warnstatement in question inadmissible as a matter of
ings are defective and the defect is not known to the
officer. In any event, the balance was struck in Harris,
state law. He criticized the Court's increasingly comand we are not disposed to change it now. 19
mon practice of correcting state courts in their view
of federal constitutional questions "without suffiBy force of its judicial authority rather than by ciently considering the risk that we will be drawn
persuasive argument, the Court thus declared that
into rendering a purely advisory opinion." 24
the incentive for police to violate the law was
21
insignificant.
1d. at 725.
22
Id. at 728. The rule in such cases is stated in Fox Film
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935):
wrote a brief dissent in which he adhered to his
Where the judgment of a state court rests upon two
dissent in Harris. He strongly criticized any sancgrounds, one of which is federal and the other
tioning of unlawful government conduct.
non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the
non-federal ground is independent of the federal
[Ilt
is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the
ground and adequate to support the judgment.
law-breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that
Justice Marshall pointed out that while the Oregon court
"[niothing can destroy a government more quickly
did not expressly cite state law in support of its judgment,
than its failure to observe its own laws ....20
the constitution of Oregon contains an independent prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination, and the court's
opinion suggests it may have considered the matter one of
Justice Brennan felt that a statement is just as
state as well as federal law. 420 U.S. at 727-28.
incriminating when used to impeach a defendant's
21420 U.S. at 727. See California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33
credibility as when introduced in direct evidence. He
(1972); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 380
also found that the Court's holding gave incentive to U.S. 194 (1965).
24420 U.S. at 726. Justice Marshall refers in particular
the police to press their interrogation of an individual
to Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973) (reversing the
18267 Ore. at 492-93, 517 P.2d at 673.
Michigan Supreme Court holding which had rejected
19420 U.S. at 723.
imposing a higher sentence on defendant on retrial);
2
0Id.
at 724.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (affirming a
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The majority opinion affirmed the Court's jurisdiction by stating that the case was decided by the
Oregon courts on fifth and fourteenth amendment
grounds, that neither state law nor the Oregon
constitution was cited for the decision, and that the
state court found it necessary to attempt to distinguish Harris. The Court briefly considered arguments raised by Hass that a State is free to impose
greater restrictions on the prosecution than required
by federal law. 25 It explained that while state law
may be restrictive of police activity:
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Hass constitutes a predictable sequel to Harris.
Once the Court ruled that a defendant's testimony
may be impeached by the use of illegally obtained
prior statements bearing directly on the crime
charged, the basis for drawing a distinction between
two forms of "technical" violations of the defendant's
constitutional rights disappeared. The argument for
making such a distinction assumes the necessity for

We are free to take this course... [but] we decline the invitation to adopt the reasoning of the dissenting justices in the Supreme Court of the United
States.
a State may not impose such greater restrictions as a
303 N.E.2d at 117. California, in a four to three decision,
matter of federal constitutional law when this Court
narrowly limited Harris by finding that prior illegally
specifically refrains from imposing them. 26
obtained statements were not "inconsistent" with unelaborated denials at trial. People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501
Since the Court had determined that this case was
P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972). The majority felt that
the goals of the exclusionary rule, deterrence of the police
decided by the Oregon court on the basis of federal
and integrity of the courts, "would be ill served indeed if the
law, Hass' arguments failed.27
People were permitted to do indirectly that which they are
forbidden to do directly ....
" 8 Cal. 3d at 179, 501 P.2d
Wisconsin Supreme Court holding which reversed convicat 921, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 353. But in People v. Nudd, 12
tions of the Amish for violating the state's compulsory
Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1974), the
balance on the court changed and the Harris rationale was
school-attendance law); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424
adopted; a defendant was held to be properly impeached by
(1971) (vacating a judgment of the California Supreme
a statement made after he had invoked his right to silence.
Court that the "hit and run" statute as written violated
The dissent argued that California had an independent
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (reversing a holding that
exclusionary rule, adopted six years prior to the application
to the states of the federal rule.
witness' prior statement not subject to cross-examination
when originally made could not be introduced under the
On the other hand, Texas and Hawaii have decided the
impeachment issue squarely on state law. In Butler v. State,
California Evidence Code to prove charges against the
defendant without violating his sixth amendment right of
493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), the court found
that the Harris reasoning, based on policy factors such as
confrontation).
2
regulation of police conduct, was not persuasive where the
CJ. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967),
where a police search was held not to have violated the
exclusionary rule is supported by other reasons. Fundamenfourth amendment. The Court added that the holding did
tal to Texas statutes regulating the admissibility of oral
not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on
confessions is the determination that "proof of extra-judisearches and seizures than required by the Federal Consticial oral confessions made while in custody are generally
tution. See also State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 368-69,
unreliable." 493 S.W.2d at 193. Since the United States
520 P.2d 51, 58 (1974).
Supreme Court requires that evidence, to be admissible for
26420 U.S. at 719. The Court cited Smayda v. United
impeachment purposes, must satisfy "legal standards of
States, 352 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
trustworthiness," Harris cannot be read to authorize such
U.S. 981 (1966) (the question in a federal court, whether
unreliable statements. This reasoning is interesting in light
surveillance was an unreasonable search under the Asof the holding in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171
(1975), that pre-trial silence is too ambiguous to be used
similative Crimes Act, is a federal question; surveillance
forbidden by the California Constitution was held not to be
for impeachment.
unreasonable under the fourth amendment) and Aftanase v.
The Hawaii Supreme Court relied on the state constituEconomy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 193 (8th Cir. 1965) (in
tional privilege against self-incrimination to exclude illethe question of jurisdiction in a diversity case, whether due
gally obtained statements in State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
process requirements have been met is a federal question).
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971). "To convict a person on the basis
"7Many state court decisions have followed the Harris of statements procured in violation of his constitutional
exception to Miranda, often as a departure from their own
rights is intolerable." 53 Hawaii at 267, 492 P.2d at 665.
precedents which had excluded tainted pre-trial statements
See also State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 520 P.2d 51
for all purposes. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551,
(1974), a case involving search and seizure, where the court
187 S.E.2d 111 (1972); Jorgensen v. People, 174 Colo. 144,
said:
482 P.2d 962 (1971). In Commonwealth v. Harris,
[T] his court has final, unreviewable authority to inter-.Mass.__, 303 N.E.2d 115 (1973), where a youth
pret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution. We have
claimed he gave a false alibi to the police because he was
not hesitated in the past to extend the protections of
scared and he felt no one would believe the truth, evidence
the Hawaii Bill of Rights beyond those of textually
of inconsistent statements was admissible for impeachment
parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights when
in spite of defective warnings. Massachusetts specifically
logic and a sound regard for the purposes of those
refused to find greater protection for the defendant in its
protections have so warranted.
55 Hawaii at 369, 520 P.2d at 58.
own constitution than that provided by federal law:

SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1975)

these circumstances did not constitute a prior inconsistent "statement."
The defendant, William Hale, stood on the street
talking with another man when the victim of a
robbery pointed him out to the police as one of five
men who had just attacked him and stolen $96. As
the police ran up to Hale, he and the other man fled.
The police immediately apprehended Hale, placed
him under arrest and took him to the police station
where he was advised of his rights and searched.
When an officer asked him to explain how he had
obtained the $158 found in his possession, Hale
made no response.
At his trial, Hale testified that he had spoken with
the victim shortly before the robbery, that he had
then gone to a narcotics treatment center where he
had been during the time of the robbery, and that he
had left the center with a friend who subsequently
purchased narcotics. Hale explained that he had run
Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
from the police because he was afraid to be found
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundwith a person carrying narcotics. He testified that his
ings, no statement obtained from the 28defendant can
estranged wife had given him $150 of her welfare
truly be the product of his free choice.
check so that he could purchase some money orders
The present Court has suggested, on the contrary, for her, as he had done in the past. In an effort to
that since the inherent pressures of being held in impeach Hale's testimony, the prosecutor asked him
custody are a normal incidence of any arrest, the why he had not given this explanation to the police.
accused is not in special need of protection. It said of Hale replied that he had not felt it was necessary at
the time."
Hass:
Hale was convicted of robbery in the United States
He properly sensed, to be sure, that he was in
District Court for the District of Columbia. The
'trouble'; but the pressure on him was no greater than
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
that on any person in like 29
custody or under inquiry by
reversed" 2 on the grounds that questioning the
officer.
any investigating
defendant about his previous silence was prejudicial,
Any statement the accused makes in these circum- and that such questioning infringed on his constitustances will be considered voluntary in the absence of tional rights. The constitutional ruling was based on
3
traditional standards for evaluating coercion. If the Miranda v. Arizona," where the Supreme Court
noted:
statements are voluntary, they will be admissible
should the prosecution wish to impeach the credibilIn accord with our decision today, it is impermissiity of a defendant who takes the stand to testify.
ble to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege when he is under police custoIMPEACHMENT BY SILENCE
dial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed
In United States v. Hale, the Supreme Court
his privilege in the face of accusaiion. 34
considered whether a defendant's prior silence may
be used at trial to impeach his credibility. Attempting
SiThe trial court instructed the jury to disregard this
to discredit his testimony, the prosecution questioned
the defendant about his failure to respond to police questioning but refused to declare a mistrial.
32498 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
questions. In a unanimous decision, the Court held
33384 U.S. 436 (1966).
that "the probative value of respondent's pre-trial
34
Id. at 468 n.37. Several circuits have held that
silence in this case was outweighed by the prejudicial cross-examination of this type violates the defendant's fifth
3
impact of admitting it into evidence."
Silence in amendment rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 475
F.2d 1066, 1068 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
28384 U.S. at 458.
(1973), where comment on defendant's failure to tell his
29420 U.S. at 722-23.
story to the police was held to be a penalty levied on the
30422 U.S. at 173.
exercise of his constitutional right; United States v. Semen(1) controlling police practices by creating sanctions
against illegal conduct, and (2) supporting an accused in the effective exercise of his rights. As to the
first assumption, the Court has decided that no
further deterrence of police activity is justified, both
because the necessity for it is "speculative" and
because there is a possibility that a defendant might
find it easier to perjure himself. As to the second
assumption, the majority feels that constitutional
rights are sufficiently protected when the penalty for
violations is the loss of direct evidence. An accused in
custody must be informed of his rights, but the police
are no longer obliged fully to cooperate should he
choose to exercise his right to consult an attorney.
The Miranda Court viewed the coercive pressures of
an arrest as an argument for providing extra protection to the accused: when he requested counsel, the
police were required to stop questioning him.

FIFTH AMENDMENT
In its case before the Supreme Court, the Government argued that Hale's failure to offer some
explanation to the police reflected on the credibility
of his explanation at trial." The Government relied
on Raffel v. United States" to support its position
that it is permissible to impeach the defendant's
credibility by forcing an admission of previous silence
in the face of police questioning. Raffel, who had not
testified at his first trial, took the stand at the second
trial3" to refute testimony which was offered at both
trials. The Court in Raffel felt that the subsequent
testimony was inconsistent with refusal to testify at
the first trial, and therefore cross-examination on the
subject was proper for impeachment purposes.
Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the
Court in Hale, 18 discussed the evidentiary value of
silence in the circumstances of the case. He concluded that silence did not have much value as
proof, but that the jury was likely to draw a strong
negative inference from the fact that Hale had not responded to police questions. 3" Since the potential
for prejudice was considerable, and the value of the
evidence for impeachment slight, permitting crossexamination of the defendant concerning his silence
during police interrogation constituted prejudicial
error.
sohn, 421 F.2d 1206, 1209 (2d Cir. 1970), where questioning the defendant on his failure to give exculpatory
statements to the F.B.I. violated his fifth amendment right
to remain silent; United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057,
1060 (6th Cir. 1969), which said there was no duty to
disclose the defense to any law enforcement officer.
But in other cases defendant's failure to tell his story to
the police has been held to be conduct inconsistent with
subsequent testimony and therefore properly used for
impeachment. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Burt v. New
Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938
(1973), where defendant's assertion at trial that a shooting
was an accident was found to be inconsistent with his failure
to check on or in some way aid the victim; United States v.
Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869 (1971), which held that failure to tell the police of a
dangerous situation when he was apprehended was inconsistent with testimony that the defendant had been coerced
into selling heroin by strangers from Mexico.
1117 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 4037 (1975).
36271 U.S. 494 (1926).
3
A second trial was required when the first jury failed
to reach a verdict.
3
Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan,
Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Douglas and White filed opinions concurring in the
judgment. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.
39
The Court in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391 (1957) points out that thejury might make impermissible use of the testimony by implicitly equating the plea of
the fifth amendment with guilt. 353 U.S. at 424.
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Justice Marshall distinguished Raffel, "where the
Court had assumed that the circumstances of the first
trial naturally called for a reply, from the situation of
an arrestee, who is under no duty to speak. 4 1 He
reasoned that silence at the police station need not be
inconsistent with exculpatory testimony at trial.42
The circumstances of an arrest and interrogation
suggest possible interpretations other than guilt
when an accused does not offer explanations. He may
be intimidated by the hostile and unfamiliar surroundings; he may be confused, frightened, or unwil"0Since the constitutional claim was not reached, the
Court did not decide whether Raffel has survived Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that the fifth
amendment was violated by prosecution comment on the
accused's failure to testify) and Johnson v. United States,
318 U.S. 189 (1943). In Johnson, Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, condemned the court's procedure of
granting a claim of fifth amendment privilege but then
allowing it to be used against the accused to his prejudice:
The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no
part of the evidence submitted to the jury, and no
inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn by them
from the legal assertion by the witness of his constitutional right. The allowance of the privilege would be a
mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected
injuriously by it.
318 U.S. at 196-97 (dictum), quoting Phelin v. Kenderdine, 20 Pa. 354, 363 (1853).Justice Black, in a concurring
opinion in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957) (in which he was joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Douglas and Brennan) felt that Raffel, already
vitiated by Johnson, sho'uld be explicitly overruled:
It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible for
courts which exist and act only under the Constitution
to draw inferences of lack of honesty from invocation of
a privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement in the
Constitution.
353 U.S. at 425-26 (Black, J., concurring).
"1The careful wording of the opinion indeed obviates a
confrontation with Raffel. The basis of the Raffel decision
was that the defendant, by testifying, had totally waived his
immunity. Justice Stone rejected the idea of a qualified
waiver which would preclude comment on the claim of
privilege at the first trial, dismissing as insubstantial the
argument that a defendant would be burdened in the
exercise of his constitutional rights. He said that the
decision to testify is inescapably embarrassing in any event;
a rule of partial immunity would not make a significant
difference. 271 U.S. at 499.
2
In some situations, silence has been thought to imply
acquiescence:
Silence [in most circumstances ambiguous] gains more
probative weight where it persists in the face of
accusation, since it is assumed in such circumstances
that the accused would be more likely than not to
dispute an untrue accusation. Failure to contest an
assertion, however, is considered evidence of acquiescence only if it would have been natural under the
circumstances to object to the assertion in question.
422 U.S. at 176.
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ling to incriminate another. He may also be relying
on his right to remain silent. 43 Since there are
various possible inferences to be drawn from failure
to respond to police questioning, the Court concluded
that silence in this situation does not tend to have
significant probative value.
In arriving at its decision, the Court relied on the
analysis in Grunewald v. United States.44 There the
defendant gave exculpatory testimony at trial, answering questions which he had refused to answer as
a witness before the grand jury on the ground that
the answers might tend to incriminate him. The
prosecutor sought to impeach his credibility by crossexamination about his previous reliance on the fifth
amendment right to remain silent. Grunewald held
that the defendant's prior silence was not so clearly
inconsistent with his later testimony as to justify its
adniission as a "prior inconsistent statement." Three
factors were identified as relevant to determining
consistency: (1) repeated assertions of innocence
before the grand jury; (2) the secretive nature of the
tribunal in which the initial questioning occurred;
and (3) the focus on petitioner as a potential
defendant at the time of the arrest, making it
"natural for him to fear that he was being asked
questions for the very purpose of providing evidence
4
against himself." "
Applying these factors to the present case, the
Court found that (1) Hale had repeatedly asserted his
innocence; (2) the police interrogation was secretive,
with fewer safeguards than grand jury proceedings;
and (3) Hale was clearly a potential defendant.at the
time of the questioning. The Court thus concluded
that his case was an even stronger one for exclusion
of the evidence than Grunewald.
In a brief concurring opinion, ChiefJustice Burger
agreed that the Court should not place the result on
constitutional grounds. He also added a few remarks
criticizing the generalization in Grunewald, which
was quoted by the majority as follows:
Innocent men are more likely to [remain silent] in
secret proceedings where they testify without advice
of counsel and without opportunity for cross-examination, than in open court proceedings where cross-examination and judicially supervised procedure provide safeguards for the establishing of the whole, as
against the possibility of merely partial truth. "
For example, he pointed out that this statement is
41In the present case, Hale had been given the Miranda
warnings just before being questioned. See note 2 supra.
44353 U.S. 391 (1957).
4 Id. at 422-23.
4"422 U.S. at 178 n.6, quoting 353 U.S. at 422-23.

supported neither by empirical data nor by ordinary
human experience, since a timid person, innocent or
guilty, is apt to react quite differently from one who
is confident and assured.
Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment, but
based his decision on the constitutional privilege: 47
I do not, like the Court, rest my conclusion on the
special circumstances of this case. I can think of no
special circumstances that would justify use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person
who asserts it."'

He felt this case was controlled by Miranda, which
explicitly proscribes comment on a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. 49 Justice Douglas
does not agree with the Court that evidence used to
impeach a defendant's credibility can be properly
distinguished from evidence tending to show guilt.
He would give full effect to Miranda in the impeachment context.
Justice White, in a separate concurring opinion,
found that due process is violated if the prosecution is
permitted to draw an unfavorable inference from the
silence of a person who has just been informed that
he has a right to remain silent and that his words can
be used against him.
Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as
well as his words, could be used against him at trial.
Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case. 5'
Although he states that he is still not "enthusiastic"
about Miranda, Justice White points out the basic
unfairness of telling an accused that he need not
explain his story and later discrediting him because
he did not. "'

From Hale and Grunewaldwe may conclude that
the prosecution will not be permitted to impeach a
defendant's credibility by comments and questions
about his failure to respond to pre-trial interrogation, at least where the situation is consistent with
innocence. In making the determination of consistency, three factors are common to both cases: (1)
repeated assertions of innocence, (2) the secretive
"Justice Douglas also agreed with Justice White that
comment on the privilege violates due process.
48422 U.S. at 182.
4"384 U.S. at 468 n.37.

Justice Douglas also expressed
this view in Johnson and Grunewald. See note 40 supra.
50422 U.S. at 183.
"During oral argument, Justice Rehnquist commented
that the fact that an accused is told he may remain silent
does not mean he has to. 17 BNA CR.. L. REP. 4037
(1975).
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nature of the tribunal, and (3) the person's status as a
potential defendant. As to the first factor, the Court
noted that there was nothing in the record of Hale's
testimony inconsistent with his claim of innocence.
The implication seems to be that if the witness makes
inconsistent or incriminating statements during his
testimony, cross-examination as to his pre-trial silence might be permissible. The second factor includes grand jury investigations and police interrogations. The Court has recognized that there may
be acceptable reasons, consistent with innocence,
for remaining silent in the face of accusatory questioning. The dictum of the Grunewald opinion, 52 to
which Chief Justice Burger objected, is indeed
phrased as a general proposition for which there is
little actual support. But it is worth noting that judicial interpretations of silence often have been
based on just such intuitive concepts of normal behavior. " The exercise of interpreting silence as
consistent with innocence is not divorced from an
imaginative effort at character and motive analysis. " The third factor in the Court's analysis of
consistent conditions is that the person be a "potential defendant." 5 5 The grand jury witness in
Grunewald was acquainted with persons already
5
5

See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
See Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. PA. L.
REv. 210 (1963) for a discussion of the assumption that
silence in the face of accusation implies consent. The author
notes a variety of maxims which have been quoted injudicial decisions. These maxims variously imply that silence is
a sign of guilt, as in "it is the nature of innocence to be
impatient of a charge of guilt . . . and an innocent person
will usually spontaneously deny the accusation," or that it
is the better part of wisdom, as in "silence never shows itself
to so great an advantage as when it is made in reply to
calumny and defamation," and "wise men say nothing in
dangerous times." Id. at 210 n.3.
",The Court suggested some possible interpretations of a
suspect's silence:
In these often emotional and confusing circumstances,
a suspect may not have heard or fully understood the
question, or may have felt there was no need to
reply. . . Or the arrestee may simply react with
silence in response to the hostile and perhaps unfamiliar atmosphere surrounding his detention.
422 U.S. at 177.
"5The Court in Grunewald found it consistent with
innocence to claim the fifth amendment privilege in the face
of possible indictment:
For many innocent men who know that they are about
to be indicted will refuse to help create a case against
themselves under circumstances where lack of counsel's assistance and lack of opportunity for crossexamination will prevent them from bringing out the
exculpatory circumstances in the context of which
superficially incriminating acts occurred.
353 U.S. at 423.
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known to be implicated in a tax fraud scheme and
therefore believed himself to be a potential defendant.
In this case, Hale had been arrested on suspicion and
had been the subject of eye-witness identification.
While the Court's three factors permitted a parallel to be drawn between Hale's situation and that in
Grunewald, ih fact, they merely state that an
accused who declines to answer police questions and
subsequently offers exculpatory testimony has not
contradicted himself. But the Court in Hale rested its
decision on the "special circumstances" of the case.
The Government contended that an innocent suspect
would have offered an explanation of the incriminating circumstances because of the opportunity for
independent corroboration and the incentive of immediate release. The Court disagreed in light of the
particular facts: the seemingly strong evidence
against Hale (such as the eye-witness identification,
his flight from the police and his possession of S158);
his prior contacts with the police; and his participation in a narcotics rehabilitation program. "In these
circumstances he could not have expected the police
to release him merely on the strength of his
'
explanation." 56
One must question how many such
facts are necessary in order for silence to be seen as
not inconsistent with innocence, that is, whether a
person who initially appears less culpable than Hale
would find that his silence in response to interrogation could be used against him at trial.
Yet, one additional fact seems an essential aspect of the holding. That is the Miranda guarantee
of the constitutional privilege to remain silent.
Justice Marshall said of an arrestee that he is under
no duty to speak. He will ordinarily have been advised of his right to remain silent and that anything
he does say can and will be used against him in
court. The implication is that the arrestee can no
longer be considered to be in a situation which
"naturally calls for a reply," despite traditional
assumptions that those who are innocently accused
will protest. After suggesting possible reasons why
a suspect may remain mute, Justice Marshall points
out in a separate paragraph that one of the "special
circumstances" of this case was that Hale had just
been given the Miranda warnings, and then concludes:
Under these circumstances, his failure to offer an
explanation during the custodial interrogation can as
easily be taken to indicate reliance on the right to
remain silent as to support an inference that
the
57
explanatory testimony was a later fabrication.
56422 U.S. at 179-80.
51

d. at 177.
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Surely this will be true of most suspects, no matter
what the particular circumstances of the case. Perhaps the "circumstance" of having a constitutional
privilege, and being reminded of it when arrested,
will protect an accused from the hazards of being impeached by his own silence.
CONCLUSION

The focus in Hass and in Hale is on the value of
impeachment material as an aid in the "search for
truth" in a criminal case. In deciding these cases as it
has, the Court is modifying the concept of absolute
guarantees of an individual's rights in favor of a more
practical adjustment between constitutional safe-

guards and the tasks of investigation and prosecution. Inconsistent statements made by the defendant,
as in Hass, are helpful to the jury and need not be
barred as long as the statements were not coerced.
The Court thus gives more latitude to the investigative process than the Miranda rationale had permitted. But when the accused has been silent, evidence of his silence is usually not valuable to the
jury because it is too ambiguous. In Hale, the Court
does not base its determination on the accused's
right not to incriminate himself, but relies on evidentiary grounds to bar impeachment by silence.
The Court is protecting the rights of the defendant
in a more traditional framework, leaving room for
balancing those rights with the claims of society.

